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I. Introduction 
Larry sued Ten Pin Lanes for personal injuries stemming from 
an unfortunate bowling accident. Vanessa, Ten Pin’s attorney, 
suspects Larry is malingering. Her diligent research digs up a gem—
Larry has been posting all over Facebook about his latest Aspen ski 
trip, and this evidence would deal deathly blows to Larry’s claim of 
physical impairment. But because Vanessa expects a long and 
expensive discovery battle if she requests the Facebook information 
from Larry directly, Vanessa decides to subpoena Facebook for 
Larry’s profile content (including any personal information, photos, 
videos, messages, wall posts, and status updates).  
Vanessa will soon find out that the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA)1 governs her request.2 But the application of the SCA to social 
networking sites like Facebook is only a recent phenomenon.3 Various 
interpretative difficulties arise when applying the SCA in this 
context, and the relevant case law has provoked more questions than 
answers.  
This Note explores the application of the SCA in civil litigation to 
aspects of social networking sites unexplored by the courts. This Note 
then proposes legislative reforms to update the SCA with respect to 
social networking sites in the civil litigation context. Part II 
summarizes the SCA. Part III analyzes Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 
Inc.,4 a landmark case applying the SCA to social networking sites. 
                                                                                                     
 1. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006). 
 2. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (applying the SCA to subpoenas directed to Facebook, MySpace, and 
Media Temple). 
 3. See id. at 977 (“Although some courts have considered the SCA’s 
application to certain types of providers, none appears to have addressed 
whether social networking sites fall within the ambit of the statute.”). 
 4. See id. at 991 (holding that private messages sent over social 
networking sites are protected from subpoena by the SCA, and remanding the 
issue of whether the plaintiff’s Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments 
could be subpoenaed after a determination of the plaintiff’s privacy settings). 
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Part IV discusses how the SCA’s application to social networking 
sites relates to general civil discovery rules. Part V addresses the 
questions left unanswered by Crispin and applies the decision to the 
parts of a Facebook profile unexplored by the court. Finally, Part VI 
proposes legislative reform. 
II. The Stored Communications Act 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA),5 part of which is a statute known as the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA).6 Generally, the ECPA was enacted to 
update the federal privacy law in light of new changes in 
communication technology.7 These “new” communications included 
“large-scale electronic mail operations, computer-to-computer data 
transmissions, cellular and cordless telephones, paging devices, and 
video teleconferencing.”8  
More specifically, the SCA portion of the ECPA governs the 
privacy of stored Internet communications in the United States.9 The 
SCA has been used to address gaps in the Fourth Amendment due to 
the advent of the Internet.10 The SCA “creates a set of Fourth 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006). 
 7. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3555 (explaining that the bill amends the federal wiretap law “to protect 
against the unauthorized interception of electronic communications” and “to 
update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of 
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies”); id. 
at 5, 3559 (noting the SCA seeks to establish “a fair balance between the privacy 
expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement”). 
 8. Id. at 2, 3556. 
 9. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 
(2004) (describing the purpose of the SCA); Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. 
Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet Communications Under the Stored 
Communications Act: It’s Not a Level Playing Field, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 569, 569 (2007) (“[The SCA] represents Congress’ attempt to strike 
a fair balance between the privacy rights of individuals who have entrusted the 
contents of their electronic communications to internet service providers and the 
government’s legitimate interest in gaining access to such communications 
when investigating crimes.”). 
 10. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1209–13 (discussing the implications of the 
Internet and Fourth Amendment privacy protection). 
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Amendment-like privacy protections by statute, regulating the 
relationship between government investigators and service providers 
in possession of users’ private information.”11 
Notably, the SCA imposes requirements that the government 
must meet to compel disclosure of users’ electronic communications.12 
The SCA also provides limits on voluntary disclosure by service 
providers of the same type of information to the government.13 
Depending on how content is classified, the SCA has a layered 
protection scheme for electronic communications, ranging from a 
search warrant requirement, to a § 2703(d) court order, to a mere 
subpoena with prior notice.14  
Whether and how the SCA protects the privacy of a 
communication depends on the classification of the provider. The SCA 
only protects communications stored by the two statutory categories 
of providers; otherwise, only Fourth Amendment protections apply.15 
In essence, the SCA provides “Fourth Amendment plus” protection to 
electronic communication stored by a statutorily defined provider.16  
The first statutory category is an “electronic communication 
service” (ECS), defined as “any service which provides to users thereof 
                                                                                                     
 11. Id. at 1212. 
 12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006) (providing the requirements of required 
disclosure of customer communications and records when such information is 
sought by a government entity); see also Kerr, supra note 9, at 1213 (“[The SCA] 
creates limits on the government’s ability to compel providers to disclose 
information in their possession about their customers and subscribers.”). 
 13. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing the limits on voluntary 
disclosure of customer communications or records by a provider of remote 
computing service or electronic communication service); see also Kerr, supra 
note 9, at 1213 (“[The SCA] places limits on the ability of [Internet service 
providers] to voluntarily disclose information about their customers and 
subscribers to the government.”). 
 14. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 (2006) (providing restrictions on compelled 
and voluntary disclosure of various content covered by the SCA). 
 15. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1213 (“If the provider fits within [the ECS or 
RCS definitions], the SCA protects the communication; otherwise, only Fourth 
Amendment protections apply.”). 
 16. See id. (“Although the private search doctrine of the Fourth 
Amendment allows private providers to make such disclosures, the SCA imposes 
limitations on the circumstances in which such a disclosure can occur.”); 
Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 576 (noting that the Fourth Amendment 
alone does not prevent Internet service providers (ISP) from disclosing user 
communication to anyone, including the government (under the private search 
and voluntary disclosure doctrines), and explaining how the SCA provides 
limitations on such disclosure). 
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the ability to send and receive wire or electronic communications.”17 
An ECS provider is only prohibited from divulging “the contents of a 
communication while in electronic storage by that service.”18 
“Electronic storage” is defined as “any temporary, intermediate 
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the 
electronic transmission thereof” or alternatively “any storage of such 
communication by an [ECS] for purposes of backup protection of such 
communication.”19  
The second category is a “remote computing service” (RCS), 
defined as an entity that provides the public “computer storage or 
processing services by means of an electronic communications 
system.”20 “Electronic communications system” is defined as “any 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities 
for the transmission of communications, and any computer facilities 
or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such 
communications.”21 RCS providers are prohibited from “knowingly 
divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of any communication 
which is carried or maintained on that service.”22 
A provider can be a RCS, an ECS, both, or neither depending 
upon what function the provider is performing.23 For example, a 
provider can hold a file in temporary, intermediate “electronic 
storage,” and that content is protected by ECS rules,24 while other 
files held for long-term storage are governed by RCS rules.25  
                                                                                                     
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006); see, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532 
F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that providers of basic e-mail services 
are ECS providers under the SCA); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 
(9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the provider of e-mail services in the case was 
an ECS). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006). 
 19. Id. § 2510(17). 
 20. Id. § 2711(2); see, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding YouTube to be a RCS with respect to its storage of user 
videos).  
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2006). 
 22. Id. § 2702(a)(2). 
 23. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1215–16 (“A provider can act as an RCS with 
respect to some communications, an ECS with respect to other communications, 
and neither an RCS nor an ECS with respect to other communications.”). 
 24. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2703(a) (2006) (providing the rules 
governing an ECS). 
 25. See id. §§ 2702(a)(2), 2703(b) (providing the rules governing a RCS). 
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Despite vast technological advancement since the SCA’s passage, 
Congress has yet to update the SCA to conform to modern day 
innovations related to e-mail and cell phones, among other things.26 
As a result, courts have difficulty applying the SCA to new 
technologies. The Crispin decision is a prime example. 
III. Crispin v. Christian Audigier 
The SCA is notoriously complicated and confusing,27 and its 
application to social networking sites has only further muddied the 
waters. In May 2010, a federal district court applied the SCA to 
determine whether the defendants could subpoena the plaintiff’s 
electronic communications from Facebook, Media Temple, and 
MySpace.28 This case appears to be the first to apply the SCA to data 
on social networking sites.29 Plaintiff, an artist named Buckley 
Crispin, filed an action against defendants Christian Audigier, 
Christian Audigier, Inc., and their various sublicensees, alleging that 
the defendants used Crispin’s art in violation of the alleged oral 
agreement between the parties.30 Defendants served subpoenas duces 
tecum on the three social networking websites (Facebook, Medial 
Temple, and MySpace) in their capacity as third-party businesses.31 
                                                                                                     
 26. See Mark Sidoti et al., How Private Is Facebook Under the SCA?, 8 
INTERNET L. & STRATEGY, Nov. 2010, at 1, 4 (“Congress has not amended the 
SCA to keep pace with changing technology. Rather, courts have had to lead the 
charge in applying the decades-old statute to modern Internet technology and 
electronic communication disclosure issues.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 
2002) (acknowledging the difficulty in interpreting the Act because “the ECPA 
was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web”); 
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the 
ECPA, and its subpart, the SCA, as “a complex, often convoluted area of law”); 
Kerr, supra note 9, at 1208 (“Despite [the SCA’s] obvious importance, the 
statute remains poorly understood. Courts, legislators, and even legal scholars 
have had a hard time making sense of the SCA.”). 
 28. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (applying the SCA to subpoenas directed to Facebook, MySpace, and 
Media Temple). 
 29. See id. at 977 (“Although some courts have considered the SCA’s 
application to certain types of providers, none appears to have addressed 
whether social-networking sites fall within the ambit of the statute.”). 
 30. Id. at 968. 
 31. Id. at 968–69. 
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The subpoenas sought Crispin’s basic subscriber information, all 
communications between Crispin and a tattoo artist named Bryan 
Callan, and all communication that referred or related to Audigier, 
Christian Audigier, Inc., the Ed Hardy brand, or any of the 
sublicensee defendants.32 Crispin moved to quash the subpoenas. He 
argued, among other things, that the subpoenas sought electronic 
communications that third-party Internet service providers are 
prohibited from disclosing under the SCA.33 The magistrate judge 
rejected Crispin’s motion to quash on SCA grounds and held that the 
social networking sites were not subject to the SCA.34 Crispin then 
filed a motion to reconsider in the Central District of California.35 
As an initial matter, the court had to decide whether Crispin had 
standing to challenge the subpoenas directed at the social networking 
sites.36 Ordinarily a party does not have standing to quash a 
subpoena issued to a nonparty unless that party can claim a personal 
right or privilege to the information that is requested from the 
nonparty.37 In this context, “an individual has a personal right in 
information in his or her profile and inbox on a social networking site 
and his or her webmail inbox in the same way that an individual has 
a personal right in employment and bank records.”38 As a result, 
Crispin had standing to bring the motion to quash.39  
Next, the court had to determine how the SCA applied to the 
third-party social networking sites. In deciding whether SCA 
protection covered the content on Facebook, Media Temple, and 
MySpace, the court had to determine whether those services were 
                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 969. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 969–70. 
 35. Id. at 970. 
 36. See id. at 973 (“Defendants [argue] that Crispin cannot assert the 
rights of Media Temple, Facebook, and MySpace, none of whom moved to quash 
the subpoenas directed to them.”). 
 37. See id. (“‘Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a 
subpoena issued to someone who is not party to the action, unless the objecting 
party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents 
sought.’” (quoting 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2459 (3d ed. 2008))).  
 38. Id. at 974. 
 39. See id. (“As with bank and employment records, this personal right is 
sufficient to confer standing to move to quash a subpoena seeking such 
information.”).  
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ECS or RCS under the SCA, depending upon what function the 
services were performing.40 Again, an ECS is defined as “any service 
which provides to users thereof the ability to send and receive wire or 
electronic communications.”41 Various courts have found that 
providers of e-mail services are ECS providers.42 The Crispin court 
analogized the private messaging services that Media Temple, 
Facebook, and MySpace provide with these types of e-mail services 
and held that the three sites at issue in the case are generally ECS 
providers.43  
As additional support for this conclusion, the court noted the 
authority on private electronic bulletin board services (BBS)44: “Court 
precedent and legislative history establish that the SCA’s definition of 
an ECS provider was intended to reach a private BBS.”45 But SCA 
protection “require[s] that the BBS be restricted in some fashion; a 
completely public BBS does not merit protection under the SCA.”46 
Because Facebook and MySpace restrict viewing of wall postings and 
comments to those with access to the user’s profile, “there is no basis 
for distinguishing between a restricted-access BBS and a user’s 
Facebook wall or MySpace comments.”47  
Next, the court had to determine whether content sought by the 
subpoenas constituted “electronic storage” within the meaning of the 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 976. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006). 
 42. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that providers of basic e-mail services are ECS providers under the 
SCA); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding 
that the provider of e-mail services in the case was an ECS). 
 43. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (“Recognizing that all three sites provide private messaging or email 
services, the court is compelled to apply the voluminous case law cited above 
that establishes that such services constitute ECS.”). Later, the court noted that 
“[t]here . . . is no basis for distinguishing between Media Temple’s webmail and 
Facebook’s and MySpace’s private messaging, on the one hand, and traditional 
web-based email on the other.” Id. at 981–82. 
 44. See id. at 980 (noting that Facebook wall postings and MySpace 
comments “are accessible only to those users plaintiff selects” and finding the 
authority on private electronic bulletin board services “relevant, if not 
controlling”). 
 45. Id. at 981. 
 46. See id. (citing case law and SCA legislative history). 
 47. Id. 
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Act.48 As mentioned above, an ECS provider is prohibited from 
divulging only “the contents of a communication while in electronic 
storage by that service.”49 There are two definitions of “electronic 
storage” in the Act. “Electronic storage” is first defined as “any 
temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,”50 
and second, as “any storage of such communication by an [ECS] for 
purposes of backup protection of such communication.”51 The court 
held that the “private” unopened messages were protected because 
the entities were acting as ECS providers and holding the unopened 
messages in “temporary, intermediate” electronic storage.52  
With respect to the opened and retained messages, the entities 
were held to be RCS providers providing electronic storage, and the 
messages were held to be protected.53 Again, RCS is defined as an 
entity that provides the public “computer storage or processing 
services by means of an electronic communications system.”54 The 
court applied case law holding that when e-mail messages were 
opened, the entity ceased to be an ECS and instead became a RCS 
providing remote storage for the e-mail.55 The court quashed the 
subpoenas seeking the private messages, opened or unopened, 
because both were held to be protected under the SCA.56  
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 982. 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006). 
 50. Id. § 2510(17)(A). 
 51. Id. § 2510(17)(B). 
 52. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (“As respects messages that have 
not yet been opened, those entities operate as ECS providers and the messages 
in are electronic storage because they fall within the definition of ‘temporary, 
intermediate storage’ under § 2510(17)(A).”). The court relied on precedent 
applying the SCA to e-mail messages stored on an Internet service provider’s 
server for this conclusion. See id. at 982 (noting case law holding that unopened 
e-mail messages are covered under the “electronic storage” definition in 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) as “temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof”). The court 
then analogized the e-mails in this context to unopened messages in Media 
Temple’s webmail service and Facebook’s and MySpace’s private messaging. Id. 
 53. See id. at 987 (“As respects messages that have been opened and 
retained by Crispin, under the reasoning of Weaver and Flagg, and the dicta in 
Theofel, the three entities operate as RCS providers providing storage under 
§ 2702(a)(2).”).  
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006).  
 55. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (discussing Weaver). 
 56. See id. at 991 (reversing the lower court order to the extent that it 
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Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments, on the other 
hand, presented “a distinct and more difficult question.”57 Wall 
postings and comments do not have a “temporary, intermediate step” 
similar to the e-mail process58 and thus could not be protected as 
temporary, intermediate storage.59 Instead, the court found that 
Facebook and MySpace are ECS providers with respect to wall 
postings and comments and that the content is in electronic storage 
for “backup purposes.”60 This part of the decision relied heavily on a 
Ninth Circuit decision, Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.61 Konop 
                                                                                                     
subpoenaed any “private” messaging). 
 57. Id. at 988. 
 58. See id. at 989 (“Unlike an email, there is no step whereby a Facebook 
wall posting must be opened, at which point it is deemed received.”). 
 59. See id. (“[A] Facebook wall posting or MySpace comment is not 
protectable as a form of temporary, intermediate storage.”). 
 60. See id. (holding that “Facebook and MySpace are ECS providers as 
respects wall postings and comments and that such communications are in 
electronic storage” for backup purposes). 
 61. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding, among other things, that the district court improperly granted 
summary judgment to Hawaiian Airlines on Konop’s SCA claim). This court had 
to decide whether the district court properly dismissed Konop’s SCA claim 
against Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Hawaiian). Robert Konop, a pilot for Hawaiian, 
alleged that Hawaiian viewed his website without authorization, disclosed the 
contents of the site, and took other actions in violation of, among other things, 
the SCA. Id. at 872. Konop’s website contained a bulletin where he posted 
comments critical of his employer, its officers, and his current airline union. Id. 
Access to the website was controlled by requiring visitors to log in with a user 
name and password. Id. Anyone accessing the site had to agree to terms and 
conditions that prohibited any member of Hawaiian’s management from viewing 
the website and prohibited disclosure of the website’s contents to anyone else. 
Id. at 872–73. The Hawaiian vice president, James Davis, accessed the site by 
using the usernames of two of Konop’s fellow Hawaiian pilots. Id. at 873. Konop 
argued on appeal that Davis accessed a stored communication without the 
proper authorization under the SCA. Id. at 879. The parties stipulated that the 
website was an “electronic communications service” and that the website was in 
“electric storage.” Id. The court assumed, without deciding, that Davis’s conduct 
constituted “access without authorization” to “a facility through which an 
electronic communication service is provided.” Id. at 879–80. The court noted 
that “the plain language of § 2701(c)(2) [of the SCA] indicates that only a ‘user’ 
of the service can authorize a third party’s access to the communication.” Id. at 
880. “User” is defined as “one who 1) uses the service and 2) is duly authorized 
to do so.” Id. The court found that neither pilot who allowed Davis to access the 
site could be found to be a “user” when they authorized Davis to access it. Id. 
Thus, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
Hawaiian on the SCA claim. Id.  
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addressed the application of the SCA to a secure website containing a 
bulletin board.62 The Konop court concluded that the private bulletin 
board at issue was in fact covered by the SCA.63 The parties agreed 
that the website containing the bulletin board was an ECS provider 
and the communication it stored was electronic storage under 
§ 2510(17).64 The Konop court did not, however, indicate whether the 
electronic storage was held for temporary and immediate storage or 
for backup.65 The Crispin court reasoned that the bulletin postings in 
Konop could not be considered to be in temporary, intermediate 
storage.66 Because the Konop court found the postings to be within 
“electronic storage,” the only other option under the SCA is for the 
postings to be stored for “backup purposes.”67 Thus, “it appears that 
the passive action of failing to delete a BBS post, which is in all 
material ways analogous to a Facebook wall posting or a MySpace 
comment, also results in that post being stored for backup 
purposes.”68  
The court, however, hedged its reasoning and alternatively held 
Facebook and MySpace to be RCS providers with respect to wall 
postings and comments.69 The court found persuasive Viacom 
International Inc. v. YouTube,70 which held YouTube to be a RCS 
                                                                                                     
 62. Id. at 872. 
 63. See id. at 875 (noting that the legislative history of the ECPA suggests 
Congress wanted to protect private communications like e-mail and private 
electronic bulletin boards). 
 64. See id. at 879 (“The parties agree that the relevant ‘electronic 
communications service’ is Konop’s website, and that the website was in 
‘electronic storage.’”). 
 65. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 988 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (noting that the Konop court “did not indicate whether the electronic 
storage was temporary and intermediate or for backup purposes”). 
 66. See id. at 989 (“Because Facebook wall postings and MySpace 
comments, on the one hand, and bulletin postings on a website such as Konop’s, 
on the other, cannot be considered to be in temporary, intermediate storage, the 
court interprets Konop as holding that the postings, once made, are stored for 
backup purposes.”). 
 67. See id. (“This reading of Konop is consistent with Theofel and Quon, 
which held that email messages and pager text-messages, respectively, were 
held for backup purposes once read.”). 
 68. Id.  
 69. See id. at 990 (“In the alternative, the court holds that Facebook and 
MySpace are RCS providers as respects the wall postings and comments.”). 
 70. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(holding, among other things, that plaintiffs cannot compel YouTube to produce 
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provider because “it provided storage services for the user . . . it stored 
the video on a web page for the benefit of the user and those the user 
designates.”71 Like the wall postings and comments, the private 
videos sought in the Viacom case “are accessible to a limited set of 
users selected by the poster and are stored on a page provided by the 
website.”72 
The subpoenas for the Facebook wall postings and MySpace 
comments were remanded to the magistrate judge for further 
findings of fact.73 Whether this information could be subpoenaed 
                                                                                                     
“private” user videos because YouTube is prohibited from doing so under the 
ECPA). The various plaintiffs in this case brought copyright infringement 
claims against YouTube and Google. In one motion, plaintiffs sought to compel 
defendant YouTube to produce copies of various “private” videos “which can only 
be viewed by others authorized by the user who posted each of them, as well as 
specified data related to them.” Id. at 264. The court found that YouTube, as a 
“remote computing service,” could not produce the videos under SCA § 2702 
because that statute does not allow a RCS to divulge “any electronic 
communications stored on behalf of their subscribers.” Id. Also, the statute 
contains “no exception for disclosure of such communications pursuant to civil 
discovery requests.” Id. The court noted that this prohibition only applies when 
the provider “‘is not authorized to access the contents of any such 
communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or 
computer processing,’” but that defendants had satisfied this condition. Id. at 
264 n.8 (quoting SCA § 2702(a)(2)(B)).  
The plaintiffs claimed that the users authorized disclosure of the contents of 
the private videos, which would allow YouTube to divulge such information 
under SCA § 2702(b)(3), by consenting to YouTube’s Use and Privacy Policy. Id. 
But the court found that none of the clauses in the Policy could be construed as 
a “grant of permission from users to reveal to plaintiffs the videos that they 
have designated as private and chosen to share only with specified recipients.” 
Id. at 265. Thus, the motion to compel production of the private video content 
was denied. Id. 
The plaintiffs also requested “non-content data” (for example, a video’s view 
count) about the videos. Id. They argued that “such data are relevant to show 
whether videos designated as private are in fact shared with numerous 
members of the public and therefore not protected by the ECPA, and then to 
obtain discovery on their claim . . . that users abuse YouTube’s privacy feature” 
to share videos but evade detection by the video’s owners. Id. The court granted 
this request, finding that the plaintiffs “need the requested non-content data so 
that they can properly argue their construction of the ECPA on the merits and 
have an opportunity to obtain discovery of allegedly infringing private videos 
claimed to be public.” Id.  
 71. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 991. 
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under the SCA depended upon whether the user’s wall was open to 
the public or restricted in some manner: as the court noted, a “review 
of the plaintiff’s privacy settings would definitively settle the 
question.”74 
The Crispin decision is important because it provided insight 
into how the SCA can be interpreted in the social networking site 
context, and it highlighted the difficulties in doing so. At the same 
time, Crispin raised many new questions: How restricted must a 
user’s content be to be subject to subpoena? Are status updates and 
profile information subject to SCA protection? Can a user’s list of 
“friends” be subject to subpoena under the SCA? Is content private 
because one must be a site subscriber to access the profile or does 
access have to be limited to a user’s friends? If the user changes his 
privacy settings in the middle of litigation, before the subpoena is 
granted, is discovery precluded? 
IV. The Stored Communications Act’s Relationship to General Civil 
Discovery of Social Networking Site Information 
Before discussing the implications of Crispin, this Part addresses 
the important parallel issue of general civil discovery between parties 
and how it relates to the subpoena of a third-party social networking 
site. The defendants in Crispin (and Vanessa, our hypothetical 
defendant’s lawyer) chose to pursue the plaintiff’s information by 
serving a subpoena on social networking websites. In federal courts, 
subpoenas in civil litigation are governed generally by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 45.75 But a litigant’s Facebook profile or MySpace 
messages are also subject to general civil discovery and the 
accompanying rules.76  
                                                                                                     
 74. Id.  
 75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (providing requirements for issuing a subpoena, 
among other things). 
 76. See Tonn Petersen, Redefining “Privacy” in the Era of Social-
Networking, ADVOCATE, Sept. 2010, at 27, 27 (noting that the defendant in 
Crispin “could still seek information directly from the plaintiff in the case”); 
Sidoti et al., supra note 26, at 5 (“[A] litigant seeking to obtain another party’s 
private online communications may be able to avoid application of the SCA 
altogether by simply serving a Rule 34 document request directly on the party 
whose communications are sought.”). 
1272 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259 (2012) 
Federal discovery requests in civil cases are governed generally 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.77 The scope of a discovery 
request is broad: parties may request discovery “regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense.”78 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) provides some 
limitations on this otherwise broad scope of permissible civil 
discovery.79 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provides more specific 
rules regarding the discovery of “electronically stored information” or 
ESI.80 While this Note’s main focus will not be the issue of civil 
discovery in the social networking context, it is helpful to compare 
this method of information gathering with the civil subpoena and the 
rules for parties and nonparties to civil litigation. This merits a brief 
discussion of the recent case law regarding the discovery of social 
networking account information—a relatively new legal issue.81 
A. Discovery Cases 
Mackelprang v. Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc.82 
involved a sexual harassment suit based on allegations stemming 
from the plaintiff’s time as an employee at Fidelity.83 During 
                                                                                                     
 77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (providing duty to disclose discovery, and the 
relevant general provisions regarding discovery). 
 78. Id. 26(b)(1). 
 79. See id. 26(b)(2)(C) (allowing the court to limit frequency or extent of 
discovery based on various factors). 
 80. See id. 34 (providing for discovery of electronically stored information, 
but within the scope of Rule 26(b)). 
 81. See EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 
2010) (discussing the principles applicable to the discovery of social networking 
sites: “[D]espite the popularity of [social networking sites] and the frequency 
with which this issue might be expected to arise, remarkably few published 
decisions provide guidance on the issues presented here”); see also Evan E. 
North, Note, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social 
Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1290–93 (2010) (discussing recent 
developments in this area). 
 82. See Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-
CV-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (holding 
that because the defendants “have failed to demonstrate a relevant basis for 
obtaining production of Plaintiff’s Myspace.com private email messages based 
on Defendants’ suspicion that they may contain sexually explicit or sexually 
promiscuous content[,]” the defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff’s consent to 
produce these messages must be denied). 
 83. See id. at *1 (noting various claims by the plaintiff).  
APPLYING THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 1273 
discovery, defendant Fidelity first attempted to subpoena MySpace 
for all the records of the plaintiff’s two accounts on the site, including 
her private e-mail communications.84 MySpace produced certain 
“public” information about the accounts, but “refused to produce 
private email messages on either account in the absence of a search 
warrant or letter of consent to production by the owner of the 
account.”85 Subsequently, plaintiff Mackelprang refused defendant’s 
request for her consent to the release of the private messages, on the 
grounds that the information is “irrelevant and improperly invades” 
her privacy.86  
Fidelity then moved to compel production of Mackelprang’s 
private e-mails on MySpace.87 The court denied this request, in part 
because of factors relating to evidence rules governing admissibility of 
sexual behavior, which in turn are relevant to whether such 
information is discoverable.88 But the court did not imply that the 
MySpace e-mails were not discoverable, and instead stated the 
opposite: “The proper method for obtaining such information, 
however, is to serve upon Plaintiff limited requests for production of 
relevant [MySpace] email communications.”89  
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Simply Storage 
Management, LLC90 also involved discovery of social networking sites 
in a sexual harassment suit.91 The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) requested a discovery conference to determine 
whether the two claimants in this case had to produce their 
“profiles”92 and other communication from their Facebook and 
                                                                                                     
 84. See id. at *2 (“Defendant Fidelity thereafter served a subpoena on 
Myspace.com . . . to produce all records for these accounts, including private 
email communications exchanged between Plaintiff and others.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. See id. at *6 (“[T]he probative value of such evidence does not 
substantially outweigh its unfair prejudicial effect to Plaintiff.”). 
 89. Id. at *8. 
 90. See EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435 (S.D. 
Ind. 2010) (holding that social networking site discovery was proper, but the 
scope of such discovery must be limited by relevancy). 
 91. See id. at 432 (describing the EEOC sexual harassment suit on behalf 
of two claimants, and the ensuing discovery dispute over the scope of social 
networking site information). 
 92. See id. at 432 n.1 (interpreting “profile” to mean “any content—
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MySpace accounts.93 The parties disagreed about the proper scope of 
discovery involving the various requests.94 The EEOC, representing 
the two claimants, objected to the requests as overly broad and 
irrelevant.95 The EEOC also objected on the grounds that the 
requests were unduly burdensome because they infringed on the 
claimants’ privacy, in addition to being harassing and 
embarrassing.96  
The court then determined the proper scope of the discovery 
requests in light of the emotional distress claims at issue. As a 
preliminary matter, the court determined that social networking site 
content is not barred from discovery because it is made “private” by 
the user.97 Next, while the court agreed that social networking site 
discovery was appropriate, the court found that its scope had to be 
limited to the circumstances (in other words, relevant within Rule 
26).98 “[T]he appropriate scope of relevance is any profiles, postings, or 
messages (including status updates, wall comments, causes joined, 
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) and [social networking 
site] applications . . . that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, 
feeling, or mental state” and also “communications that reveal, refer, 
or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to produce a 
significant emotion, feeling, or mental state.”99 The same test would 
                                                                                                     
including postings, pictures, blogs, messages, personal information, lists of 
‘friends’ or causes joined—that the user has placed or created online by using 
her user account”). 
 93. Id. at 432. 
 94. See id. (noting disputed discovery requests over photographs, videos, 
and electronic copies of profile pages from Facebook and MySpace). The requests 
for electronic copies of the profile pages included “all status updates, messages, 
wall comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, 
detail, blurbs, comments, and applications.” Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. See id. (“The EEOC objects to production of all SNS content (and to 
similar deposition questioning) on the grounds that the requests are overbroad, 
not relevant, unduly burdensome because they improperly infringe on 
claimants’ privacy, and will harass and embarrass the claimants.”). 
 97. See id. at 434 (“[A] person’s expectation and intent that her 
communications be maintained as private is not a legitimate basis for shielding 
those communications from discovery.”). 
 98. See id. at 435 (“It is reasonable to expect severe emotional or mental 
injury to manifest itself in some SNS content, and an examination of that 
content might reveal whether onset occurred, when, and the degree of 
distress.”). 
 99. Id. at 436. 
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apply to photographs and videos.100 Third-party communications had 
to be produced if the claimants’ own communications put them in 
“context.”101  
In Romano v. Steelcase, Inc.,102 Romano brought a personal 
injury action against Steelcase. Steelcase sought an order giving 
access to Romano’s Facebook and MySpace accounts, believing it 
could find information that would discredit Romano’s claims 
regarding her injuries.103 The court mentioned reviewing the SCA but 
did not offer any related analysis.104 Presumably, the court did not 
find that it governed the case. Under the New York state civil 
discovery standard of “material and necessary,” the court found that 
Romano’s Facebook and MySpace accounts were both material and 
necessary to Steelcase’s defense, and that the account information 
could lead to admissible evidence.105 
B. Relevance to the Stored Communications Act 
As the prior discussion shows, parties in civil litigation are 
subject to discovery procedures (including requests for production and 
subpoenas), but nonparties can also be compelled to produce 
information by order of a subpoena.106 A party may attempt to 
                                                                                                     
 100. See id. (“The same test set forth above can be used to determine 
whether particular pictures should be produced.”). 
 101. See id. (“Third-party communications to [claimants] must be produced 
if they place these claimants’ own communications in context.”). 
 102. See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2010) (holding information from Romano’s Facebook and MySpace accounts 
discoverable).  
 103. See id. at 653 (“Steelcase contends that a review of the public portions 
of [Romano’s] Facebook and MySpace pages reveals that she has an active 
lifestyle and has traveled to Florida and Pennsylvania during the time period 
she claims that her injuries prohibited such activity.”). After looking at the 
public portions of her profile, Steelcase sought to question Romano at her 
deposition and sought a request for authorization to access her Facebook and 
MySpace accounts. Id. Romano did not cooperate with either request. Id.  
 104. See id. at 651–52 (“The Court has reviewed . . . the applicable federal 
statutory law, specifically the Stored Communications Act . . . .”). 
 105. See id. at 654 (“[T]here is a reasonable likelihood that the private 
portions of her sites may contain further evidence such as information with 
regard to her activities and enjoyment of life, all of which are material and 
relevant to the defense of this action.”).  
 106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (providing the rule for civil subpoenas). 
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subpoena a nonparty’s information through a Rule 45 request, but 
this request cannot overcome the protections provided in the SCA.107 
There are exceptions to these SCA protections, but “the exceptions 
enumerated in § 2702(b) do not include civil discovery subpoenas.”108 
The lack of an exception in the SCA for civil discovery subpoenas 
explains why the SCA, rather than the civil procedure rules, governed 
the Crispin decision.109 
On the other hand, a court may force a party in the course of civil 
discovery to “consent” to produce electronically stored information 
within its “control” under Rule 34, thus avoiding the SCA issue.110 
                                                                                                     
 107. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 
606, 609 (E.D.V.A. 2008) (upholding a magistrate judge’s order quashing a 
subpoena requesting a nonparty’s e-mails from AOL because there is no 
exception in the SCA for such disclosure). 
 108. Id. at 611; see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 
965, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“The [SCA] does not mention service of a civil 
subpoena duces tecum.”); Timothy G. Ackermann, Consent and Discovery Under 
the Stored Communications Act, 56 FED. LAW. 42, 43 (Dec. 2009) (“[Section] 2702 
of the SCA does not provide a general exception for complying with civil 
discovery.”); Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 587 (“[T]he SCA contains no 
exception for civil discovery . . . .”). 
 109. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (applying the SCA to subpoena 
requests to nonparty social networking sites). This Note, in Part VI.B., argues 
that the SCA should include a civil litigant exception that it now lacks. 
 110. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(holding that the SCA does not prevent Defendant from giving consent to a 
third-party to release text messages relevant to discovery). The Court stated:  
Defendant City is both able and obligated to give its consent, as 
subscriber, to SkyTel’s retrieval of text messages so that the City may 
comply with a Rule 34 request for their production . . . . [A] party has 
an obligation under Rule 34 to produce materials within its control, 
and this obligation carries with it the attendant duty to take the 
steps necessary to exercise this control and retrieve the requested 
documents . . . . [A] party’s disinclination to exercise this control is 
immaterial, just as it is immaterial whether a party might prefer not 
to produce documents in its possession or custody. 
Id.; see also Ackermann, supra note 108, at 43 (“Section 2702(b)(3) of the SCA 
does, however, create an exception based on lawful consent that applies to civil 
discovery.”); Steve C. Bennett, Civil Discovery of Social Networking Information, 
39 SW. L. REV. 413, 423 (2010) (“[A litigant] may be required to provide consent 
for access to social networking sites that contain [relevant] information . . . . [I]f 
the litigant has the ability to obtain ‘control’ over such information by providing 
consent to the ISP, then the litigant must provide such consent as part of its 
discovery obligations.”). But there is at least one authority to the contrary. See 
J.T. Shannon Lumber Co. v. Gilco Lumber Inc., No. 2:07-CV-119-SA-SAA, 2008 
WL 4755370, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 29, 2008) (denying plaintiff’s motion to 
compel defendant’s consent for information held by ISPs). The court reasoned 
APPLYING THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 1277 
Consequently, in the context of civil litigation, the SCA is most 
relevant to requests for electronically stored information of 
nonparties, or for parties who forgo the discovery route and subpoena 
a nonparty ECS or RCS for the opposing party’s information. Thus, 
this Note focuses on the SCA’s application to civil subpoenas served 
on social networking sites outside of the normal discovery context 
between parties.  
Nevertheless, the availability of discovery procedures does not 
undermine the importance of the application of the SCA in the social 
networking context. Again, the SCA still protects nonparties who are 
not subject to the discovery process.111 Also, litigants have incentives 
to retrieve information directly from a social networking site because 
this tactic is easier than obtaining the information from the opposing 
parties themselves.112 Accordingly, it is still important that there be 
clear standards for what the SCA does and does not protect when 
litigants subpoena social networking sites for information. 
V. Applying Crispin v. Christian Audigier  
Crispin provided two important answers. First, social 
networking site information is subject to protection under the SCA. 
The court determined that the SCA protects information on 
Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple because, depending on what 
function they are serving, the sites are either ECS or RCS.113 Second, 
                                                                                                     
that this request would allow an “end run around the [SCA],” which implies that 
the court believed the SCA should still preclude the request. Id. In any event, 
“the plaintiff has other means of obtaining any discoverable information at its 
disposal, which would not be contrary to the Stored Communications Act.” Id.  
 111. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 609 
(upholding a magistrate judge’s order quashing a subpoena requesting a 
nonparty’s e-mails from AOL because there is no exception in the SCA for such 
disclosure). 
 112. See Derek S. Witte, Your Opponent Does Not Need a Friend Request to 
See Your Page: Social Networking Sites and Electronic Discovery, 41 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 891, 897 (2010) (“Because an individual Facebook [user] does not have 
direct access to the servers upon which his or her pages are stored [or access to 
archived information] . . . the best way to discover this potentially rich ESI . . . is 
by requesting it directly from the sites themselves.”).  
 113. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (holding that the social networking sites are ECS when they hold 
private unopened private messages but RCS regarding opened and retained 
private messages). When Facebook or MySpace holds a wall post or comment, 
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privacy settings matter. Crispin’s privacy settings on his Facebook 
and MySpace accounts would “definitively settle the question” 
whether the defendants could subpoena Crispin’s wall posts and 
comments.114 Private messages, on the other hand, were analogized 
to e-mails and were held to be protected.115 
But even with the guidance of Crispin, social networking sites 
fail to find a good fit within the statutory framework of the SCA. 
Crispin left important questions unanswered, particularly regarding 
the issue of privacy settings.116 This Part addresses the issue of what 
should be sufficiently “private” for protection under the SCA,117 
applies Crispin to the various Facebook profile parts that the court 
did not address,118 and addresses the question of when, in the course 
of litigation, a user’s privacy settings are relevant.119 
A. Privacy Settings Should Not Be Determinative of Whether a User’s 
Profile Is “Private” Under the Stored Communications Act 
How private must a user’s information be to be protected? 
Generally, the SCA prohibits voluntary disclosure from a public 
provider of electronic communications120 but does not protect 
electronic communications “readily accessible to the general 
public.”121 
                                                                                                     
they operate as ECS or RCS. See id. at 989–90 (holding that the sites are ECS in 
this regard, but alternatively holding that they are RCS).  
 114. Id. at 991. 
 115. See id. (quashing a subpoena for webmail and private messages 
because they are “inherently private” and “not readily accessible to the general 
public”).  
 116. See, e.g., Alan Klein et al., Social Networking Sites: Subject to 
Discovery?, THE NAT’L L.J., Aug. 23, 2010, at 15, 19 (“Is content private if one 
must be a subscriber to access it, or must access be limited to a user’s ‘friends,’ 
which on Facebook may number in the thousands?”); Petersen, supra note 76, at 
27–28 (“Does the definition of privacy merely turn on whether a user chooses a 
public or private setting by the click of a mouse? If so, can a user involved in 
litigation make critical information inaccessible simply by changing privacy 
settings on his or her Facebook or MySpace pages?”).  
 117. Infra Part V.A.  
 118. Infra Part V.B. 
 119. Infra Part V.C. 
 120. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing the voluntary disclosure rules 
and exceptions). 
 121. See id. § 2511(2)(g) (“It shall not be unlawful under [the SCA] for any 
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Crispin implicitly rejected the argument that signing up for a 
Facebook account to access another user’s profile is a sufficient 
privacy bar: “[E]ither the general public had access to plaintiff’s 
Facebook wall and MySpace comments, or access was limited to a 
few.”122 The general public would necessarily have to sign up for 
Facebook to access the profile.123 Apparently, the court viewed this 
registration step as irrelevant to the privacy determination. 
Also, according to the court, a user with numerous “friends” on a 
social networking site would still have “private” wall posts, so long as 
the proper privacy settings were in place.124 To base a rule on the 
number of friends would result in “arbitrary line-drawing” and would 
lead to “anomalous result[s].”125 While the court’s concerns are 
legitimate, one could imagine a Facebook profile that can only be 
viewed by a user’s friends but still falls within the statutory language 
of “readily accessible to the general public.”126 For example, celebrity 
Facebook profiles are relatively common. A celebrity could restrict her 
profile only to her “friends,” yet her “friends” could be 
indiscriminately “accepted” without regard to who they might be. In 
practical terms, this hypothetical Facebook profile would be “readily 
accessible to the general public.” Simply because a user’s profile is set 
to “private” should not foreclose the possibility that the profile still 
                                                                                                     
person . . . to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an 
electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic 
communication is readily accessible to the general public.”). 
 122. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 123. See Facebook, Sign Up for Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/r.php 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (requiring a first and last name, e-mail address, 
password, gender, and birthday to create a Facebook account) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Crispin also covered MySpace, but this Note 
only focuses on Facebook because Facebook is today’s preeminent social 
networking site and because the discussion of a single social networking site, as 
opposed to multiple, is preferable for the sake of clarity.   
 124. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (noting that the number of 
plaintiff’s Facebook friends who can view a wall post “has no legal significance”). 
 125. See id. (“[B]asing a rule on the number of users who can access 
information would result in arbitrary line-drawing and likely in the anomalous 
result that businesses such as law firms, which may have thousands of 
employees who can access documents in storage, would be excluded from the 
statute.”). While this discussion was within the court’s discussion of the sites as 
RCS, the court presumably would apply the same logic to the ECS context. 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g) (2006). 
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may be readily accessible to the general public and thus unprotected 
by the SCA. 
B. Extending Crispin to the Rest of a User’s Facebook Profile  
While Crispin only addressed private messages and wall posts or 
comments in the social networking context, there is a plethora of 
other information that a litigant could seek. Facebook allows a user to 
update his status, post videos and photos, and to include various 
profile information.127 As with wall posts, Facebook allows a user to 
restrict the previously mentioned information to either all, some 
(including, for example, an option for only friends in your network), or 
none of his friends.128 Or, a user can leave this information open to 
any Facebook user.129 This subpart applies the logic of Crispin to 
Facebook profile content that the court did not address. First, it 
addresses whether certain profile content is “electronic 
communication” under the SCA. Second, it determines whether 
Facebook acts as either an ECS or RCS with respect to that profile 
content. 
1. Facebook Profile Content Is Electronic Communication Under the 
Stored Communications Act 
There is a preliminary question: what content can be properly 
deemed “communication”?130 The SCA only protects “electronic 
                                                                                                     
 127. See EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 432 n.1 (S.D. 
Ind. 2010) (interpreting “profile” to mean “any content—including postings, 
pictures, blogs, messages, personal information, lists of ‘friends’ or causes 
joined—that the user has placed or created online by using her user account”). 
 128. See Facebook, Facebook’s Privacy Policy (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (explaining 
Facebook’s privacy policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 129. Id.  
 130. See Witte, supra note 112, at 900 (“[I]t is possible that the Stored 
Communications Act, which only protects communications from disclosure, may 
prohibit these [social networking] websites from divulging the other contents of 
someone’s page, such as photos, the individual’s ‘wall,’ . . . ‘friends,’ or other data 
displayed on the page.”). Witte also notes that he “could find no case addressing 
the issue of whether social networking sites fall within the scope of the Stored 
Communications Act.” Id. Witte’s article was published just prior to the Crispin 
decision.  
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communication” from disclosure.131 The statute defines “electronic 
communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in 
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system.”132 The Crispin court held that sufficiently private wall posts 
and comments and private messages are protected under the SCA as 
electronic communication.133 The Viacom court held that YouTube 
videos were protected and, if only implicitly, deemed the videos 
“communication.”134 
Given the broad definition of electronic communication in 
§ 2510(12), it is likely that all profile content of a Facebook page 
would be protected by the SCA as “electronic communication.”135 A 
user’s status updates and profile information are all “written” and 
thus within § 2510(12).136 It seems relevant that the Crispin court did 
not even find it necessary to address whether the wall posts and 
comments were electronic communications.137  
Photos would be covered by the term “images.” While videos are 
not explicitly mentioned, this is in all likelihood not an intentional 
omission but instead indicative of the technology in 1986, when 
                                                                                                     
 131. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006) (“[An ECS] shall not knowingly 
divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in 
electronic storage by that service.”); id. § 2702(a)(2) (“[An RCS] shall not 
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication 
which is carried or maintained on that service.”).  
 132. Id. § 2510(12). 
 133. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (holding plaintiff’s private messages protected under the SCA and 
remanding the wall posts and comments issue for a determination of privacy 
settings). The court did not specifically address whether the messages were 
electronic communication, but this determination was indeed necessary to reach 
the holding. 
 134. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(holding that plaintiffs cannot compel YouTube to produce “private” user videos 
because YouTube is prohibited from doing so under the ECPA).  
 135. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining “electronic communication” as 
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of 
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988–91 (applying the SCA to the 
subpoena requests for plaintiff’s Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments 
but neglecting to address whether such information was “electronic 
communication” within the Act).  
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Congress enacted the ECPA. The Viacom court has already held that 
the SCA protects videos (without discussing the threshold “electronic 
communications” issue),138 and § 2510(12) covers videos without 
straining the statutory text.139 It would be rather anomalous for the 
SCA to protect “images” and not videos.    
Whether a user’s list of “friends” is covered by § 2510(12) 
presents a slightly more difficult problem. One could argue that 
because a user’s friend is represented as a picture, it is within the 
definition of an “image.” Names of friends, of course, are in “writing,” 
and this could be another ground. A list of friends could arguably 
even be deemed “data.” In any event, it is unlikely that a court would 
hold that a user’s list of friends falls outside the electronic 
communication definition in § 2510(12). In conclusion, despite the 
peculiarities of Facebook profile content, all of it should be covered by 
the SCA definition of “electronic communication.” 
2. Facebook Acts as Both a RCS and an ECS 
Next, it must be determined whether Facebook acts as a RCS or 
an ECS with respect to profile content. The distinction is pertinent 
because, under the SCA, disclosure protection levels differ based on 
how content is classified.140 How the content is classified then 
determines whether an entity is acting as a RCS or an ECS.141 If 
Facebook is neither an ECS or a RCS with respect to this profile 
content, then SCA protection is unavailable and only Fourth 
Amendment protections apply.142  
                                                                                                     
 138. See Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 265 (holding that YouTube videos protected 
by the SCA, but not discussing whether those videos are “electronic 
communication” within the Act).  
 139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining “electronic communication” as 
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of 
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system”). 
 140. See id. §§ 2702–2703 (providing voluntary and required disclosure rules 
for the various content covered by the SCA); see also Kerr, supra note 9, at 
1222–23 (explaining the basic disclosure rules of the SCA). 
 141. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 (2006) (providing the disclosure rules 
governing RCS and ECS). 
 142. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1213 (“If the provider fits within [the ECS or 
RCS definitions], the SCA protects the communication; otherwise, only Fourth 
Amendment protections apply.”). 
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The Crispin court, in an alternative holding, held Facebook and 
MySpace to be RCS providers supplying remote storage for the wall 
posts and comments.143 In Viacom the court found that YouTube was 
acting as a RCS because it “stored the video on a web page for the 
benefit of the user and those the user designates,” and the private 
videos sought were “accessible to a limited set of users selected by the 
poster and . . . stored on a page provided by the website.”144 Like in 
Viacom, the wall postings and comments in Crispin were stored on 
Facebook’s website for the user, subject to the user’s privacy 
settings.145  
Applying the Crispin and Viacom logic, Facebook acts as a RCS 
regarding personal profile information (relationship status, religious 
views, birth date, contact information, etc.) on a user profile.146 
Personal profile information, like the wall posts and comments in 
Crispin and the videos in Viacom, is stored on Facebook’s website, 
and access is limited as selected by the user.147 Accordingly, these 
different aspects of a user’s profile content should be subject to the 
same analysis that the Crispin court applied to wall posts and 
comments. That is, the user’s privacy settings determine whether the 
requested information could be subpoenaed under the SCA under the 
“readily available to the general public” standard.148 
There is a counterargument that Facebook is acting as an ECS 
rather than a RCS. Indeed, the Crispin court first held that Facebook 
and MySpace were acting as ECSs with respect to the wall posts and 
                                                                                                     
 143. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (holding, in the alternative, that Facebook and MySpace are RCS 
providers with respect to wall postings and comments). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. (“The private videos whose production plaintiff sought to compel 
[in Viacom] are thus analogous to the Facebook wall postings and MySpace 
comments defendants seek here, in that both are accessible to a limited set of 
users selected by the poster and are stored on a page provided by the website.”).  
 146. Id. 
 147. See Facebook, Controlling How You Share, http://www.facebook.com/ 
privacy/explanation.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (discussing various types of 
personal profile information a user can add and how the user can restrict 
viewing access to such content) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 148. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (remanding for a determination of 
privacy settings to decide whether the plaintiff’s wall posts and comments could 
be subpoenaed).  
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comments149 and only alternatively held that the entities were acting 
as RCSs.150 But under Crispin and Konop, the ECS argument is less 
persuasive for personal profile information. Personal profile 
information is closer to the RCS distinction in Viacom than the ECS 
distinction in Konop.151 Unlike the private electronic bulletin board in 
Konop, only the user can post his personal information to his profile 
page.152 The bulletin board in Konop, in contrast, allowed for multiple 
users to post information.153 A user’s posting of personal profile 
information is therefore more similar to the YouTube user in Viacom 
who posts videos to his account; both users are solely in control of how 
and what content is posted, and accordingly, a social networking site 
acts as a RCS with respect to storage of this information. 
The ECS argument is more persuasive when analyzing an 
outside user’s post on the user’s Facebook wall. The Crispin court 
analogized the wall posts and comments to the secure website 
containing an electronic bulletin board in Konop and found that 
Facebook and MySpace were ECS providers providing electronic 
storage for backup purposes.154 The Crispin court reasoned that the 
passive action of failing to delete a bulletin board post in Konop, 
which resulted in the post being stored for backup purposes, was 
analogous to the storage of wall postings and comments.155 Like the 
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 989 (holding that “Facebook and MySpace are ECS providers 
as respects wall postings and comments and that such communications are in 
electronic storage” for backup purposes). 
 150. See id. at 990 (“In the alternative, the court holds that Facebook and 
MySpace are RCS providers as respects wall postings and comments.”). 
 151. Compare Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that a website providing a private electronic bulletin board is 
acting as an ECS), with Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding YouTube to be a RCS with respect to its storage of 
videos for a user).  
 152. Facebook, Controlling How You Share, http://www.facebook.com/ 
privacy/explanation.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 153. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 872 (describing how access to the electronic 
bulletin board was limited to users made eligible by Konop). 
 154. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (holding that “Facebook and 
MySpace are ECS providers as respects wall postings and comments and that 
such communications are in electronic storage” for backup purposes); id. (“This 
reading of Konop is consistent with Theofel and Quon, which held that email 
messages and pager text-messages, were held for backup purposes once read.”). 
 155. See id. (“[I]t appears that the passive action of failing to delete a BBS 
post, which is in all material ways analogous to a Facebook wall posting or a 
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electronic bulletin board in Konop, multiple users can post to a user’s 
profile wall, assuming the user has set privacy settings allowing other 
users to do so.156 Accordingly, under the Konop and Crispin logic, 
when a user posts on another user’s wall, the failure to delete that 
post makes Facebook an ECS providing backup protection with 
respect to the recipient user’s wall posts.157 
Unfortunately, the distinction is meaningless in the context of 
civil litigation. The SCA prohibits a public ECS or RCS from 
voluntarily disclosing the content of a user’s communication, barring 
an exception not relevant here.158 So, when it is determined that a 
user’s Facebook content is protected because the site is acting as an 
ECS or a RCS, we get the same result: the covered content that is not 
readily available to the general public is protected. What matters 
here is that Facebook fits both the RCS or ECS definition rules so 
that user content is protected, assuming the content is sufficiently 
private. The ECS/RCS distinction is more pertinent in the criminal 
context, where the rules governing compelled disclosure have been 
widely criticized.159 
                                                                                                     
MySpace comment, also results in that post being stored for backup purposes.”). 
 156. See Facebook, Controlling How You Share, http://www.facebook.com/ 
privacy/explanation.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (explaining how a user can 
control the use of his profile wall) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 157. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (explaining that, under Konop, “it 
appears that the passive action of failing to delete a BBS post, which is in all 
material ways analogous to a Facebook wall posting or MySpace comments, also 
results in that post being stored for backup purposes”). 
 158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006) (providing voluntary disclosure rules and 
exceptions). Section 2703 provides the disclosure rules for when the government 
compels information from an ECS or a RCS, and these can vary from a search 
warrant requirement to no restriction at all, based on the type of content. Id. 
§ 2703. Apparently, when a civil litigant subpoenas an ECS or a RCS, the 
voluntary disclosure rules, not the compelled disclosure rules, apply despite the 
court’s participation (as the “government”) in the process. Also, the SCA does 
not prohibit voluntary disclosure by nonpublic providers. Id. § 2702.  
 159. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 9, at 1233 (“The most obvious problem with 
the current version of the SCA is the surprisingly weak protection the statute 
affords to compelled contents of communications under the traditional 
understanding of ECS and RCS.”); Digital Due Process, Comments to NTIA in 
the Matter of Information Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy 1 
(June 14, 2010), available at http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/files/NTIA_NOI_ 
061410.pdf (arguing that “[t]he government should obtain a search warrant 
based on probable cause before it can compel a service provider to disclose a 
user’s private communications or documents stored online”). One court has even 
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C. Determining at What Point in Time Privacy Settings Matter 
Accompanying the privacy settings issue is the question of 
exactly when the settings should be taken into account.160 The point 
in time a user’s privacy settings matter will probably depend on the 
nature of each individual case. For example, using the hypothetical in 
the introduction, assume Larry’s Facebook profile was fully public 
when he posted about his post-injury ski trip. Then, assume during 
the middle of his lawsuit, Larry privatized his profile before Vanessa 
subpoenaed Facebook. What is the relevant time in determining what 
his privacy settings are and thus whether his profile content can be 
subpoenaed under the SCA?  
Presumably, the latest time a user’s privacy settings would be 
relevant is at the time of a subpoena to the social networking site. On 
the other hand, Vanessa could argue the relevant time is the time of 
Larry’s posts. Crispin did not offer the lower court any guidance on 
this point, and at present the answer is unclear.161  
Social networking sites may or may not keep track of when a 
user changes his privacy settings. If Vanessa could prove a change in 
Larry’s privacy settings through information from Facebook, she 
could then argue that the court should apply the privacy settings 
analysis when he posted the relevant information. Otherwise, 
Vanessa would have to resort to obtaining evidence of the past public 
or private nature of Larry’s profile herself.  
                                                                                                     
ruled some of the compelled disclosure requirements unconstitutional. See 
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that “a 
subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails” 
stored with or sent through an Internet service provider). As a result, “[t]he 
government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a 
subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.” 
Id.  
 160. See Klein et al., supra note 116, at 19 (“May a user avoid discovery 
simply by modifying his or her settings at the time of trial?”); Petersen, supra 
note 76, at 27–28 (analyzing Crispin and asking whether “a user involved in 
litigation [can] make critical information inaccessible simply by changing 
privacy settings on his or her Facebook or MySpace pages”).  
 161. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (noting that a “review of the 
plaintiff’s privacy settings would definitively settle the question” of whether the 
plaintiff’s wall posts and comments could be subpoenaed, but providing no 
further guidance as to what point in time the privacy settings should be taken 
into account). 
APPLYING THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 1287 
There is an argument that a user’s change in privacy settings 
violates a preservation obligation.162 Parties (or future parties) 
generally have a duty to preserve relevant evidence once they are 
reasonably aware of the possibility of impending litigation.163 A 
Facebook user who privatizes his Facebook profile after a lawsuit has 
been filed could arguably be “destroying” relevant evidence and be 
subject to sanction.164 Again, on this point, the law is unclear. 
VI. Proposed Legislative Reform 
While the previous Part outlined how courts should approach 
social networking sites under the current version of the SCA, this 
Part proposes SCA legislative reform. ECPA (and SCA) reform is at 
the door of both Congressional houses.165 The SCA should be 
reformed for two reasons. First, it unnecessarily distinguishes 
between RCS and ECS, a now irrelevant distinction that only serves 
to confuse the courts.166 Second, the current SCA fails to provide an 
exception for civil litigants, which, if added, would lessen the burdens 
on service providers and courts and clarify discovery standards for 
civil litigants.167 
                                                                                                     
 162. See Witte, supra note 112, at 901 (arguing that social networking site 
information should be preserved when an individual believes it could be 
relevant to a foreseeable or ongoing lawsuit). 
 163. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note (describing when a 
preservation obligation may arise); 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284.1 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the preservation 
obligation as related to electronically stored information). 
 164. See Witte, supra note 112, at 895 (arguing that there is a preservation 
obligation with respect to the contents of social networking sites). 
 165. See generally The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting 
Security and Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Reform: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. (2010); ECPA Reform and the Revolution of Location 
Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. (2010); ECPA 
Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
 166. Infra Part VI.A.  
 167. Infra Part VI.B. 
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A. Collapse the ECS/RCS Distinction 
First, the ECS and RCS distinction should be eliminated because 
it no longer provides any functional purpose and unnecessarily 
occupies the time of courts and litigants. This is not a new 
suggestion.168 Professor Orin Kerr authored a 2004 law review article 
providing a “legislator’s guide” to the SCA and has suggested that the 
SCA be rewritten so that it applies only to “network service 
providers.”169 While this Note generally agrees with Kerr’s argument, 
it proposes that it should be refined to include the recent 
developments with respect to Crispin and the SCA’s application to 
social networking sites.  
Kerr’s proposal would eliminate the distinction that is based on 
the function a provider performs and would instead “distinguish 
among the files a provider holds based on its function with respect to 
that file.”170 It is unclear whether Kerr’s proposal would include social 
networking sites within the definition of network service providers.  
The SCA should be amended to collapse the ECS/RCS distinction 
into the single category of “network service provider,” but the 
“network service provider” definition should include social networking 
sites. In the wake of Crispin, we know that social networking sites 
are governed by the SCA, and these sites should continue to be 
protected under any new legislation and included within a new 
unifying definition.171 This reform would retain the intent of the 
original statute while simplifying the text for courts.172 It would also 
promote judicial economy; courts, like the one in Crispin, would no 
longer have to unnecessarily labor over the ECS/RCS distinction.173 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1235 (“Congress could eliminate the 
confusing categories of ECS and RCS and simply incorporate these concepts into 
the statute directly.”). 
 169. See id. (“Congress could rewrite the statute so that the SCA applied to 
only ‘network service providers,’ which could be defined using a combination of 
the current definitions of ECS and RCS.”).  
 170. Id. Professor Kerr provides the text of proposed statutory language. Id. 
at 1235–38. 
 171. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (applying the SCA to subpoenas 
directed to Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple). 
 172. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1237–38 (noting that collapsing the ECS and 
RCS distinction would simplify the text without losing functionality in both 
§ 2703 and § 2702 of the SCA). 
 173. See Sidoti et al., supra note 26, at 8 (“One need look no further than the 
legal acrobatics that the Crispin court and others have employed to determine 
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This proposition finds further support in the civil litigation context 
because despite the distinction (ECS or RCS) given to a social 
networking site, the same protections apply.174 
B. Include an Exception in the Stored Communications Act for Civil 
Litigants  
Second, the statute should provide a disclosure exception for civil 
litigants. Currently, the SCA bans ECS and RCS from voluntarily 
disclosing “content” information when subpoenaed by civil litigants175 
unless such information is “readily available to the general public.”176 
In our hypothetical, this means that, under current law, Vanessa 
could not subpoena the “content” (or substance) of Larry’s messages, 
wall posts, status updates, videos, photos, or profile information if this 
content is (or was) sufficiently private. Including a disclosure 
exception in the SCA for civil litigants would allow parties, in certain 
circumstances, to subpoena content information from a service 
provider or social networking site. A specified disclosure exception 
would clarify discovery standards for both courts and litigants while 
lessening the burden on providers and sites subject to the SCA. This 
Note argues that Congress should adopt a modified version of Marc 
Zwillinger and Christian Genetski’s proposed disclosure exception 
amendment discussed below. 
In a 2007 article, Zwillinger and Genetski argue that the SCA 
creates an “uneven playing field” regarding the standards governing 
“[Internet service providers’] disclosure of Internet communications 
that turn on the nature of the information sought and the identity of 
the person seeking it.”177 In short, when the government seeks 
                                                                                                     
whether . . . Facebook or MySpace is an ECS and/or RCS provider to conclude 
that the SCA is outdated . . . .”). 
 174. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (describing how the 
ECS/RCS distinction is irrelevant in relation to the level of voluntary disclosure 
protection given to user content). 
 175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing the requirements the 
government must meet to force disclosure of “content” information). 
 176. See id. § 2511(2)(g) (“It shall not be unlawful under [the SCA] for any 
person . . . to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an 
electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic 
communication is readily accessible to the general public.”). 
 177. Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 590. 
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information from an Internet service provider (ISP) under the SCA, 
the information is subject to qualified privacy protection, depending 
on the type of information sought.178 In contrast, when a criminal 
defendant or civil litigant seeks information from an ISP under the 
SCA, “content” information is absolutely protected, while “non-
content” information is afforded no protection at all.179  
When the government seeks content information (for example, 
the substance of an e-mail) it must meet the statutory 
requirements.180 A criminal defendant or civil litigant, on the other 
hand, cannot compel content information directly from an ISP 
without requesting the government to compel the information for 
them.181 But noncontent information (such as “IP addresses of 
government informants, the buddy lists of alleged co-conspirators, or 
the identity of an insulting poster to a message board”182) is more 
easily accessed by the criminal defendant or civil litigant because the 
SCA provides exceptions to disclosure of noncontent information to 
“any person other than a governmental entity.”183  
In practice, Zwillinger and Genetski argue, the advantage that 
nongovernment entities may have in compelling noncontent 
information is largely gone.184 While the SCA does not restrict ISPs 
                                                                                                     
 178. See id. (“If the government is the seeker, then non-content and content 
information are both given qualified privacy protection along a sliding scale in 
which the privacy of content is more closely guarded.”); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2702–2703 (2006) (providing the requirements the government must meet to 
force disclosure of content and noncontent information). 
 179. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 590 (“If, however, the 
seeker is a criminal defendant or civil litigant, then content is afforded absolute 
privacy protection, and non-content is afforded no protection at all.”); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2006) (allowing a provider to divulge noncontent 
information to “any person other than a governmental entity”). 
 180. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006) (providing the requirements the 
government must meet to force disclosure of content information). 
 181. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 593 (“[D]efendants may . . . 
ask the government to intercede and compel disclosure of the communications 
and then turn them over to defendants upon receipt.”). Zwillinger and Genetski 
note the problems associated with this method: “[A]ny attempt by criminal 
defendants to enlist the courts to force the government’s hand in issuing process 
raises serious separation of powers issues.” Id.  
 182. Id. at 590. 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006). 
 184. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 590 (“[A]ny benefit to 
defendant’s of the SCA’s free pass for disclosures of non-content information has 
been more or less eroded by voluntary privacy practices of ISPs.”). 
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from divulging noncontent information, the ISPs have self-imposed 
privacy policies that “promise users the ISP will not disclose their 
information to any third party absent legal process.”185 As a 
consequence, in practice, criminal defendants and civil litigants must 
get a subpoena or court order to get noncontent information—the 
same limitations imposed on the government.186 In sum, the 
government is advantaged when requesting content information, and 
all parties are on equal footing when requesting noncontent 
information.  
Zwillinger and Genetski propose an amendment187 that they 
believe would “harmonize the interest of the criminal defendant, civil 
litigant, subscriber, and ISP.”188 The proposed showing would be 
similar to what SCA § 2703(d) requires.189 This proposed amendment 
                                                                                                     
 185. Id.  
 186. See id. at 591 (“The playing field for non-content information, as a 
matter of ISP policy, is leveled.”). 
 187. See id. at 597–98 (proposing an SCA amendment that provides an 
exception for civil and criminal litigants). The text of the proposed amendment 
is as follows: 
A non-governmental entity who is a party to pending criminal or civil 
litigation may petition the court in which such litigation is pending 
for an order requiring a service provider to disclose contents of 
electronic communications in electronic storage or contents of wire or 
electronic communications in a remote computing service and such 
order shall issue only if the requesting party can demonstrate that 
the requested information is relevant and material to the ongoing 
litigation and is unavailable from other sources, and both the 
subscriber or customer whose materials are sought and the service 
provider from whom the materials will be produced are provided 
reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard. In the case of a 
State court, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law 
of such state. A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a 
motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify 
such order, if the information or records requested are unusually 
voluminous in nature, or compliance with such an order would cause 
an undue burden on such provider. In all cases, the service provider 
shall be entitled to cost reimbursement by the requesting party, as 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2706. 
Id.  
 188. Id. at 598. 
 189. Id. at 597; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (“A court order . . . shall 
issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire 
or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”). 
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has several benefits: it provides notice and an opportunity to be heard 
to the subscriber and service provider before disclosure, it preserves 
the ECPA’s preference for serving a subpoena on the subscriber or 
customer before the ISP (or social networking site), and it protects the 
interests of the ISP (or social networking site) by allowing it to move 
to quash or modify an order and to recover reasonable costs.190  
The proposed amendment should be modified slightly. Discovery 
rules can vary by jurisdiction, and the amendment should account for 
this. For example, it could include this phrase: “The court issuing an 
order under this section shall determine relevancy and materiality 
according to the law of its jurisdiction.” Case law can also vary by 
jurisdiction as to what constitutes an “undue burden” on a service 
provider, so Congress should add a similar provision regarding the 
determination of an undue burden.  
Returning to our hypothetical, this exception would allow 
Vanessa to subpoena Facebook for the content of Larry’s Facebook 
profile if she could prove that the information was both relevant and 
material to her case and unavailable from other sources. Reasonable 
notice and opportunity to be heard would also have to be given to 
Larry and Facebook. Facebook would be allowed to move to quash 
any order that it believed would be an undue burden. Finally, 
Facebook could get cost reimbursement from Vanessa as the 
requesting party.  
This disclosure exception would give courts and litigants clear 
standards on what governs a request for information that would 
otherwise be protected by the SCA. It would also require a party to 
exhaust other sources of the requested content,191 thus lessening the 
burden on service providers. Finally, it would still preserve the 
privacy of nonparties who are not subject to the information sharing 
that is required of litigants. 
VII. Conclusion 
For now, courts must trudge through the 1986 version of the 
SCA to apply its statutory categories to modern-era social networking 
sites. Whether social networking sites are acting as an ECS or a RCS 
                                                                                                     
 190. Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 598. 
 191. See infra Part IV (discussing the general discovery of social networking 
sites). 
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regarding a user’s content, that content should be protected from 
voluntary disclosure so long as it is not “readily available to the 
general public.” 
In reforming the SCA, Congress should collapse the ECS/RCS 
distinction and include social networking sites within a singular 
entity definition. This would allow courts to avoid the unnecessary 
deliberation and confusion that accompanies determining whether a 
site like Facebook acts as an ECS or a RCS. This would also preserve 
the functional purposes of the SCA without undermining any of its 
protections.  
Further, without an exception for civil litigants, the SCA has 
caused unnecessary confusion for courts and parties alike. Congress 
should include such an exception that allows parties, after exhausting 
other remedies, to obtain social networking site information that is 
relevant to the ongoing litigation. Any such exception should allow 
courts to conform discovery procedures to local rules. As a result, the 
standards governing disclosure of social networking content would be 
much clearer for courts and litigants while still preserving SCA 
privacy protections for nonparties. 
Congress seems poised to revamp the SCA in the near future; the 
legislature would serve the legal system well to bring the SCA out of 
the technological Stone Age and in line with modern innovations.  
